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FRANCES H. MILLER* 
Malcolm Gladwell explored the way certain ideas and behav­
iors can proliferate "just like viruses do" once they achieve a critical 
mass in The Tipping Point,l his best-seller about the sorts of wide­
spread and rapidly adopted social phenomena he labels epidemics. 
Gladwell's subtitle, "How Little Things Can Make a Big Differ­
ence," indicates that he thinks it need not take much to get one of 
these social epidemics rolling. He does believe, however, that three 
factors are essential: getting "people with a particular and rare set 
of social gifts" involved? packaging the ideas so they are "irresist­
ible" under the circumstances,3 and making sure that both the right 
people and the right presentation can be deployed in the perfect 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Professor of Public 
Health, Boston University School of Public Health; and Professor of Health Care Man­
agement, Boston University School of Management. 
1. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITrLE THINGS CAN MAKE 
A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000). 
2. [d. at 33 (the example he cites is the success of Paul Revere on his Midnight 
Ride). 
3. [d. at 132 (his example is the stunning success of Sesame Street in helping chil­
dren's learning). 
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context for change.4 That usually means inheriting or creating a 
situation where one can "tinker[] with the smallest details of the 
immediate environment" to unleash the idea's potential for reach­
ing a tipping point, and thus morph into an epidemic leading to 
change.5 
As I thought about tying the six thought-provoking essays in­
cluded in this Symposium on The Politics of Health Law together 
under some sort of unifying theme, Gladwell's theories kept coming 
back to me. How would the issues these distinguished authors ad­
dress-the Schiavo imbroglio, the constitutionality or criminality of 
palliative care, organ donation from minors, medical tourism and 
outsourcing, the way political ideology affects health care access, 
and pending federal legislation to expand individual insurance­
fare when examined through the lens of Gladwell's analytical theo­
ries? Are any of the health care issues explored in this Symposium 
heading for the kind of tipping point that might change the way 
society traditionally grapples with them? The more I thought about 
using this organizing theme for knitting these seemingly disparate 
essays together, the more I came to view the articles as sorting 
themselves onto a continuum moving away from a theoretical po­
tential for tipping point status, depending on how many of Glad­
well's three conditions for epidemic status were present. Whether 
Tipping Point theory really has anything predictive to say about the 
future course of these issues I cannot say, but the exercise has been 
an interesting way to tease apart their differences. 
Once a tipping point is reached, mere possibilities or exhorta­
tions for change can gain momentum and become transformed into 
full-blown new ways of handling problems. In extraordinary cases, 
unleashing "epidemic potential" can work paradigm shifts in the 
way people think and behave about health care issues. The famous 
health care tipping point that first leaps to mind concerns the radi­
cal transformation occasioned by the launch of Britain's National 
Health Service.6 After a century of tinkering with hospital reform 
on the local level, Big Bang health care change came almost all at 
4. Id. at 139-46 (here his case in point involved cleaning up New York City graffiti 
and broken windows to trigger the decline of violent crime during the 1990s). 
5. [d. at 146. 
6. See generally CHARLES WEBSTER, THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE: A POLlT· 
ICAL HISTORY (1998). 
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once to Britain when the central government officially assumed 
ownership of the nation's public hospitals on July 5, 1948.7 
Radical structural reform was accomplished so swiftly and 
completely in Post-War Britain because many factors coalesced, in­
cluding experience during the government's unavoidable takeover 
of hospitals while hostilities were continuing. But once peacetime 
came, the efforts of just one man, Labour's politically adroit and 
extraordinarily persuasive Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, were 
key to public and political acceptance of fundamental structural 
change.8 By way of contrast, the Clinton Health Care reforms went 
down to defeat in flames in the mid-1990s, despite a charismatic and 
persuasive national leader elected at least in part on his pledge to 
reform our health insurance system, primarily because they were 
presented in a complicated form and dialogue that amounted to the 
antithesis of irresistible packaging.9 
A more successful example of American Tipping Point behav­
ior concerns the transformation of the Veterans Administration 
hospital network from the scorned stepchild of U.S. hospital sys­
tems lO into an institution delivering "top-notch healthcare"ll in lit­
tle more than a decade.12 An energetic and persuasive Under 
Secretary for Health, Kenneth Kizer, led the transformation begin­
ning in the mid-1990s with publication of a vision statement13 and a 
road map for accomplishing reform.14 But the factor th&t made 
transformation irresistible was that Kizer managed to convince eve­
ryone concerned that the system either had to change or die. The 
VA's 200,000 employees came to understand that their jobs were at 
7. See generally GEOFFREY RIVETI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LONDON HOSPI· 
TAL SYSTEM 1823-1982 (1986). 
8. Id. at 264-78. 
9. Daniel Yankelovich, The Debate That Wasn't: The Public and the Clinton Plan, 
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 7, 7-23. 
10. For a negative portrayal of VA health care, see the Oscar-winning movie 
BORN ON THE FOURTH OF JULY (Universal Studios 1989). 
11. Christopher J. Gearon, Military Might: Today's VA Hospitals are Models of 
Top-Notch Care, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 18, 2005, at 100-06 (appearing as part 
of the annual special report, America's Best Hospitals). 
12. Jonathan B. Perlin, Guest Editorial, Transformation of the U.S. Veterans 
Health Administration, 1 HEALTH ECON. POL. & L. 99 (2006); Gilbert M. Gaul, Re­
vamped Veterans' Health Care Now a Model, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2005, at AI, availa­
ble at 2005 WLNR 13195602 (Westlaw). 
13. KENNETH KIZER, VISION FOR CHANGE: A PLAN TO RESTRUCTURE THE VET­
ERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (1995). 
14. KENNETH KIZER, PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE: THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES UNDERLYING THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE VETERANS 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (1996). 
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stake if, for example, they did not facilitate a switch to electronic 
medical records. Electronic records in turn permitted performance 
measurement and systems improvement. Little changes like that 
were the key to massive progress for the whole enterprise. All 
three of Gladwell's essential factors coalesced to constitute the tip­
ping point that set the VA improvement epidemic in motion. 
Among these Symposium articles, my most plausible candidate 
for Tipping Point status in the foreseeable future is examined in 
Professor Kathy L. Cerminara's Collateral Damage: The Aftermath 
of the Political Culture Wars in Schiavo.1s Professor Cerminara 
delves deeply into the dismaying facts surrounding the politically 
postponed death of Terri Schiavo as "an example of a more general 
politicization of bioethics."16 In so doing, she illuminates how very 
strongly the majority of the American public reacted against out­
sider and government intrusion into what it regards as the intensely 
personal dying process. Cerminara describes the near-incredible 
saga of the Schiavo case as it made its tortuous journey through 
state and federal courts and legislatures, ultimately attracting the 
official involvement17 of both a governor and a sitting President.18 
The full impact of what transpired on the route toward obtaining 
the release this powerless woman sought from a sadly diminished 
life makes for chilling reading indeed.19 
Professor Cerminara then probes the aftermath of Schiavo to 
see what lessons can be drawn from its tragic facts for individuals, 
for "the tone and pattern of end-of-life decisions,"2o for bioethics, 
and about our "constitutional republican form of government. "21 
Her exploration of these issues leads her to conclude that because 
of the Schiavo case's very high visibility in the media, "it height­
ened citizens' awareness"22 of the possibility that a person's end-of­
life wishes can be politically thwarted, and by outsiders at that. It 
thus propelled the right-to-die issue into public consciousness in a 
15. See Kathy L. Cerminara, Collateral Damage: The Aftermath of the Political 
Culture Wars in Schiavo, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 279 (2007). 
16. !d. at 289. 
17. The majority of the American public viewed this as meddling, not mere 
"involvement. " 
18. That these men happened to be brothers is not unrelated [pun intended]. 
19. This essay takes as a given that, as her husband maintained and as every court 
which examined the facts found, Terri Schiavo would not have wanted to continue liv­
ing under the circumstances of her irreversible medical condition. 
20. Cerminara, supra note 16, at 289. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 307. 
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way that might make political interference in such inherently pri­
vate decisions far less likely in the future. 
If we apply Gladwell's criteria to the Schiavo situation, Terri 
Schiavo's unsought celebrity-the ubiquity of her picture in the me­
dia for months on end as the drama played out-transformed her 
into a mute but highly effective spokeswoman for others sharing 
her sad predicament. The fact that she could not speak for herself 
was the very thing that made her so charismatic as a poster child for 
personal autonomy, the right to choose to let life go at the point 
where we are most helpless to accomplish it on our own. Secondly, 
members of the public could identify easily with the plight of an 
attractive young woman plunged suddenly into a physical and 
mental limbo where she could no longer speak, hear, think, feel, or 
rebel. Most people identifying with her condition believed that had 
they been in the same situation they, too, would have chosen 
"death as a management option."23 In other words, the right-to-die 
dilemma emblazoned itself onto public consciousness in a frame­
work that made its intellectual and emotional appeal very hard to 
resist. 
Finally, the context in which these end-of-life decision points 
arise is usually below the public radar screen-notwithstanding 
Terri Schiavo's very public travails-and the case itself made clear 
that the future prospects of successful interference in a death that it 
can at least be reasonably inferred a patient would want under the 
circumstances, are exceedingly slim. This, and the fact that death­
and-dying situations ordinarily arise in highly private circumstances, 
make it less likely that such a public travesty will play out again in 
the near future. In this case, tipping point analysis would point to­
ward a reduction in outsider interference and a corresponding in­
crease in public confidence that these personal and painful 
decisions according substance and credence to personal autonomy, 
will continue to be respected. 
Professor Stephen Arons in a sense both foreshadows and am­
plifies the Schiavo controversies as he sounds a note of serious con­
cern with his Article, Palliative Care in the U.S. Healthcare System: 
Constitutional Right or Criminal Act?24 Focusing on the ideological 
23. Cf John A. Robertston, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A 
Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1975) (analyzing the dilemma confronted by 
parents who choose not to seek routine surgical or medical care for babies born with 
other severe developmental disabilities). 
24. See Stephen Arons, Palliative Care in the U.S. Healthcare System: Constitu­
tional Right or Criminal Act?, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 309 (2007). 
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polarization he states has led to a depressing state of "acceptable 
collateral damage of the culture wars," Professor Arons warns 
about our increasing propensity for turning private medical deci­
sions into "intemperate and ill-informed public struggle[s],"25 Most 
specifically, he is concerned about unwarranted interference in 
those situations where terminal patients have decided to eschew 
life-sustaining medical intervention and seek only palliative mea­
sures. This interference was exemplified by the former U.S. Attor­
ney General's threat to use his powers under the Controlled 
Substances Act26 to examine physicians' intent in prescribing con­
trolled substances to terminal patients. 
Professor Arons theorizes that the principle of personal auton­
omy "is being deconstructed ... to promote beneficent paternalism 
or to advance concepts . . . held by various religious or interest 
groups."27 He examines the landmark Cruzan,28 Glucksberg,29 and 
Qidlpo cases to tease out the constitutional implications of adminis­
tering palliative care that could hasten the death of terminal pa­
tients in the course of relieving pain. He also criticizes state and 
federal initiatives-including the report of President Bush's Com­
mission on Bioethics31-that would interfere with the physician-pa­
tient relationship in terminal situations. His overall perspective is 
wary and cautionary about the prospect that widely accepted con­
stitutional liberties will be eroded. 
If one applied Malcolm Gladwell's Tipping Point theory to 
Professor Arons's analysis, the first question would have to be: 
"From which direction are we viewing palliative care as a prob­
lem?" Stating the question that way probably tips the answer as 
well. On neither side of the issue do there appear to be "people 
with a particular and rare set of social gifts" who can motivate 
enough others to jump onto the palliative care bandwagon-either 
way-to set an epidemic in motion. John Ashcroft, the Attorney 
General who tried to use the Controlled Substances Act to under­
cut Oregon's Death with Dignity Act,32 would no longer seem to fit 
25. Id. at 309. 
26. 21 U.S.c. §§ 801-904 (2000). 
27. Arons, supra note 24, at 312. 
28. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
29. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
30. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
31. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING 
IN OUR SOCIETY (2005), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/takin~care/ 
takin~care.pdf. 
32. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (2005). 
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the bill-if he ever did.33 Moreover, it would be hard to package 
either side of the issue in a way that would make it seem irresistible 
to enough people to get the ball rolling. 
Physician-assisted suicide is still highly controversial, yet 
prohibiting doctors from trying to relieve the pain of their patients' 
terminal illnesses would offend large segments of the population.34 
Nonetheless, the context in which most palliative care decisions are 
made is not usually likely to attract public attention, and double­
effect palliative treatment has in fact been medically commonplace, 
albeit low-profile, for many decades.35 Because Gladwell's three 
Tipping Point factors point in inconsistent directions here, the palli­
ative care issue does not seem poised for epidemic movement in 
either direction-at least not at the present time. If, however, a 
compelling factual situation arose wherein a patient sympathetic 
and famous enough to put an identifiable face on the issue were 
forced to suffer because palliative care was denied, I could envision 
public momentum building toward a tipping point for the kind of 
legal clarification that would bring above-board social acceptance 
for this right-to-die issue. 
Professor Michele Goodwin's Essay My Sister's Keeper?: Law, 
Children, and Compelled Donation,36 tackles the bioethical under­
pinnings of compelling organ and tissue donation from children. 
The title and the foregoing sentence read literally as semantic ox­
ymorons, and Professor Goodwin intends us to think of her subject 
that way. Compulsion and donation are linguistically opposed con­
cepts, yet most readers familiar with cases involving minors as or­
gan and tissue donors are conditioned not to take those words 
literally. Goodwin seeks to shake her readers into analyzing exactly 
what is at stake when we use children-compel them to donate 
parts of their physical selves-for the purpose of medical interven­
tions designed solely to help others, even though we usually dis­
guise that compulsion in best-interests terminology. 
33. David Sclar, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling in Gonzales v. Oregon Upholds the 
Oregon Death With Dignity Act, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 639, 639 (2006). 
34. See, e.g., Hospice Patients Alliance, Pain Control: Methods and Standards of 
Care, http://hospicepatients.orglhospic29.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2007) ("Most pa­
tients and families who use hospice services expect that the hospice will make every 
effort to relieve the pain which afflicts their loved one."). 
35. Cf Daniel P. Sulmasy, Commentary, The Rule of Double Effect: Clearing Up 
the Double Talk, 159 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 545 (1999). 
36. See Michele Goodwin, My Sister's Keeper?: Law, Children, and Compelled 
Donation, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 357 (2007). 
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Donation is a volitional concept, whereas compulsion requires 
the application of force-volition's opposite-to achieve its objec­
tives. The public is not conditioned to think that courts and loving 
parents lawfully apply force to remove physical parts of children's 
bodies solely for other people's benefit, but Professor Goodwin's 
article requires us to confront the fact that best-interests rhetoric 
often obscures that uncomfortable truth. Her extensive examina­
tion reveals that the rationales traditionally trotted out to justify 
taking tissue and organs from children for the medical rescue of 
third parties on the basis of parental consent stem from cases in­
volving the mentally deficient and mentally ill. The best-interests 
justification simply does not stand up well to searching legal or ethi­
cal analysis where child donors are involved. 
Goodwin would proscribe taking organs from children younger 
than age thirteen altogether, always appoint a guardian ad litem to 
protect the interests of those prospective minor donors older than 
thirteen, and require family and independent counseling for the 
prospective donor and parents, to force them to understand both 
the immediate and the longer run physical and psychological impli­
cations of their actions. She would also require an independent 
physician for the prospective donor. Finally, she would require pro­
spective minor donors to explain to the court their reasons for 
wanting to make such extraordinarily altruistic gestures. Presuma­
bly if those statements were not sufficiently persuasive-volitional 
in fact?-judicial approval for their "donations" would not be 
granted. Professor Goodwin acknowledges that her proposal would 
shrink the available pool of minor donors, but she intends that re­
sult. She wants to push us toward a tipping point that will force 
reconsideration of our "altruistically based procurement regime."37 
How close are we to the point of rethinking compelled organ 
and tissue donations from children whose parents consent in their 
"best interests"? Probably not very close if we apply Gladwell's 
Tipping Point criteria. In the first place, no advocate with the ex­
traordinary social skills needed to move the cause to public promi­
nence has thus far emerged. Nor does compelled donation from 
minors usually arise in a context ripe for Gladwell's little changes 
that could set an epidemic for rethinking the legal response in mo­
tion. Moreover, situations conducive to compelling donation from 
minors tend to arise rarely, privately, and in isolation from one an­
other. Where the potential donor's parents are in accord on supply­
37. Id. at 404. 
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ing consent for the donation in the presumed best interests of their 
child, we are not likely to see high-profile portrayals of the situation 
as the kind of child exploitation merely for the benefit of another 
that would become one of Gladwell's irresistible spurs to public 
action. 
To the contrary in fact; the media spotlight has been primarily 
on appealing patients-often children-in desperate need of rescue 
via tissue or organ donation from others, rather than on their po­
tential rescuers.38 When the potential rescuer is a Good Samaritan 
child 'asked' to undergo an inherently dangerous medical proce­
dure but unable to give legal consent on her own, and no proffered 
benefit to her can stand up to critical evaluation, the public-and 
legal-reaction might be different if a passionate advocate ap­
peared on her behalf. One could imagine a compelling set of facts 
that would shift the mind-set of an American public more condi­
tioned to embrace technological intervention framed in the best in­
terests of a child who can facilitate it by donating "non-essential" 
bodily tissue, than to question the donation's ethical ambiguities. 
But bringing the issue to public consciousness would still require 
skilled advocacy, and when the parents supply consent supporting 
the donation, outsiders have trouble being perceived as carrying 
moral authority to intervene on the child's behalf. 
Professor Barry Furrow's pull-no-punches Essay, Access to 
Health Care and Political Ideology: Wouldn't You Really Rather 
Have a Pony?,39 constitutes a forthright plea for ideological change 
to "repair our system from the top down."4o Professor Furrow be­
gins by rehearsing the well-known high costs (an "epidemic" itself 
in Gladwell's phraseology) and in many cases questionable quality 
of the health care delivered in this country. He then zeroes right in 
on the access problems that permeate our system to terrify those 
without health insurance, and to worry many others who have cov­
erage now, but fear it is either inadequate or they will lose it alto­
gether in the future. In a wonderful turn of both phrase and 
metaphor, he muses that "a large part of the population want[s] to 
38. See, e.g., Kyla Dunn, Cloning Trevor, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2002, at 31­
52 (telling the story, complete with cover photograph, of an extremely appealing little 
boy suffering from adrenoleukodystrophy, "a rare and underdiagnosed genetic 
disorder"). 
39. See Barry Furrow, Access to Health Care and Political Ideology: Wouldn't 
You Really Rather Have a Pony?, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 405 (2007). 
40. [d. at 406. 
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age more rapidly, a perverse quest for the Fountain of Age,"41 in 
order to become Medicare-eligible and thus sure of guaranteed 
coverage. 
Professor Furrow's real target in this piece is the siren song of 
choice market theorists aver that competition brings to health care, 
along with its much-vaunted efficiency and reduced waste. He ex­
poses the hollowness of choice rhetoric for those with limited or 
non-existent health insurance, and considers it a serious "stumbling 
block" to improving access to care. He also considers choice rheto­
ric "cartoonish" because of its strong superficial appeal to the indi­
vidual in all of us, which in turn makes us resist questioning the 
value of what we really get in the way of options. What Furrow 
really wants is for us to question the market ideology on which 
much of our current health policy rests. 
How do Professor Furrow's ideas fare when subjected to Mal­
colm Gladwell's Tipping Point factors? Not very well, I'm afraid. 
For better or for worse, competition principles structure our health 
care delivery system, and Furrow seeks nothing less than to change 
the "rooted ideology" that brought market theories to medicine. 
That's a tall order-one could even call it tilting at a windmill these 
days-and no champion with "exceptionally persuasive social 
skills" appears anxious to take on that task. President Clinton 
might have done it when he was first elected with what most 
thought was a mandate to reform health care, but as noted previ­
ously, the Clintons blew the opportunity and the moment passed. 
One could argue that presenting universal coverage reform in 
humanitarian terms, augmented by hard data about the human and 
financial costs of inadequate access to health care, could attract ad­
herents in the manner of one of Gladwell's irresistible ideas. How­
ever, that idea would have to come up head-to-head against the 
health care choice rhetoric already shown to be extremely hard for 
most Americans to resist. Moreover, the concept of greater choice 
is quite simple for most people to grasp, whereas universal coverage 
has many moving parts that have to be coordinated before it could 
be implemented. This makes it much more difficult for the public 
to understand and thus espouse the cause. 
Finally, we do not yet (or again?) have the perfect context for 
change Gladwell believes is necessary to set fundamental structural 
change in motion for health care. Everyone realizes our health care 
system has many problem areas, but the public does not perceive 
41. /d. at 408. 
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these as part of larger systemic failures. It certainly does not view 
these problems as the sort that challenge our ideological predilec­
tions and cry out for structural reform. No one realizes that more 
clearly than Professor Furrow, but he is in no frame of mind to give 
up on the effort. He believes that ideology can be remade, and that 
most people would probably be willing to swap a little choice-the 
pony, if you will-for better health if they really understood what 
the stakes were. 
The subject matter Professor Nicolas Terry explores in Under­
Regulated Health Care Phenomena in a Flat World: Medical Tour­
ism and Outsourcing,42 is probably among the least likely issues ex­
amined in this Symposium to attract Tipping Point treatment any 
time soon. The (mostly) international health care transactions he 
analyzes generally operate so far beneath the radar screen of public 
perception that few people are aware of them, let alone consider 
them a problem in need of better regulation. Professor Terry exam­
ines the behind-the-scenes re-structuring of health care going on de 
facto when patients travel, often to other countries, to get medical 
services, and when insurers and providers outsource medically re­
lated ancillary services to foreign venues. The common motivation 
for both phenomena is the universal search for lower health care 
costs, and in a small but growing number of cases those practices 
overlap when domestic payors actively promote medical tourism for 
their insureds. 
Professor Terry sets forth chapter and verse documenting the 
past decade's explosion of medical tourism and ancillary medical 
service outsourcing. Defining medical tourism as "treatments or 
surgery that have been planned in advance to take place outside a 
patient's usual place of residence,"43 he observes that much of this 
travel reverses prior trends and moves from affluent countries to 
those where labor costs are cheaper but no less professional. Thus 
certain foreign countries (South Africa, India, Mexico, Thailand, 
and Indonesia, for example) have promoted themselves as dual­
purpose destinations, providing high quality medical and dental ser­
vices, plus a vacation before or after you have received care. 
With regard to medical outsourcing of non-clinical work, many 
foreign countries (India, Israel, and Pakistan, for instance) can offer 
not only cheaper costs but a highly skilled workforce accustomed to 
42. See Nicolas P. Terry. Under-Regulated Health Care Phenomena in a Flat 
World: Medical Tourism and Outsourcing, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 421 (2007). 
43. [d. at 422. 
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providing around-the-clock transcription, IT, medical interpretation 
(reading EKGs and radiology scans), and other services needed by 
health care insurers and (usually institutional) providers. Professor 
Terry tells us medical outsourcing is not only increasing rapidly, but 
expanding in scope to include such high-level functions as strategic 
planning, pharmaceutical benefits management, and systems 
design. 
The problem with all of this foreign involvement in U.S. medi­
cal care is that much of it takes place in a physical and political 
context that makes it extremely difficult to regulate effectively. 
Noting that the United States does not even have national licensing 
for physicians, Terry reminds us of the problems that Internet pre­
scribing presents for intra-state regulation, let alone attempting to 
regulate physician services internationally. Quality of care, clinical 
trials, and the privacy and confidentiality of medical information 
are but three other areas where trying to regulate the bioethical, 
cost, quality, and other aspects of health care internationally consti­
tutes a legal and logistical nightmare for all concerned. In Terry's 
matter-of-fact words, "Outsourcing is essentially unregulated and is 
likely to remain that way."44 That summation pretty much fore­
closes any tipping point inquiry on my part. None of Gladwell's 
three factors are present to indicate any potential for imminent so­
cial change, so in the short run we will just continue to muddle 
through. Perhaps some major catastrophe-or stunning success­
will transpire to focus public attention on these extra-territorial and 
essentially unregulated phenomena, but the global nature of any 
attempt to Make Things Better makes that possibility accordingly 
harder to accomplish. 
Finally, Professor Elizabeth Pendo's submission to this Sympo­
sium, The Health Care Choice Act: The Individual Insurance Market 
and the Politics of "Choice" ,45 is my candidate for the subject mat­
ter its author would least like to see come to a tipping point. Given 
the recent congressional election results, putting Democrats in con­
trol of both the House and the Senate, I predict she will get her 
wish-at least in the short run. Professor Pendo's Article analyzes 
pending federal legislation, The Health Care Choice Act of 2005 
(the Act),46 designed to permit health insurers to market individual 
44. Id. at 470. 
45. See Elizabeth Pendo, The Health Care Choice Act: The Individual Insurance 
Market and the Politics of "Choice", 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 473 (2007). 
46. Health Care Choice Act of 2005, H.R. 2355, 109th Congo (2005); Health Care 
Choice Act of 2005, S. 1015, 109th Congo (2005). 
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policies approved in any state without having to comply with any 
additional regulatory strictures imposed by the insured's state of 
residence. In essence, the Act enables insurers to market (presum­
ably cheaper) individual policies without having to comply with the 
benefits that may be mandated by the state in which they want to 
sell their product. Thus, under the Act, a policy now marketed in 
California without infertility treatment benefits, for example, could 
be sold in Massachusetts without that coverage as well, even though 
Massachusetts (but not California) mandates that infertility cover­
age47 be offered by all insurers currently doing business in the 
Commonwealth. 
Professor Pendo acknowledges the grave obstacles the unin­
sured of this country must surmount in order to obtain and pay for 
non-group health insurance, but she makes a persuasive case that 
the Act is hardly the solution for that problem. She shows that not 
only will the cost of coverage for these individual policies be un­
likely to fall, but that they are also unlikely to increase access to 
medical services or offer adequate benefits to most subscribers who 
purchase them either. As was the case with Professor Furrow's arti­
cle, Professor Pendo's real target here is the illusion of individual 
choice and freedom that the plan's proponents utilize to sell their 
idea. She believes that free choice rhetoric appealing to a benefici­
ary's self-interest is fundamentally at odds with the social solidarity 
underpinnings of insurance that make it such an effective risk­
spreading mechanism for the ordinary subscriber. 
I do not think Professor Pendo needs to worry that we are any­
where near a tipping point that would transform the Act she op­
poses into the law of the land. Recent changes in the political 
control of Congress should see to that, for choice rhetoric and indi­
vidual responsibility for obtaining health insurance are not usually 
considered touchstones of the Democratic Party's approach to 
health care policy. Moreover, the Act's presentation certainly has 
not arrived in packaging that would be irresistible to most unin­
sured people who lack resources to buy ordinary health insurance, 
nor has an effective and charismatic spokesperson appeared to pro­
pel the idea to public prominence among others. Finally, the pre­
sent context in which the idea would have to gain momentum 
simply is not charged enough with regard to health insurance 
problems to produce this kind of incremental change. Those with­
out insurance constitute a small and relatively powerless interest 
47. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47H (2004). 
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group, and those who have it are as a group relatively indifferent­
despite rhetoric to the contrary by many-about making coverage 
more widely available for others. Moreover, no powerful interest 
groups would seem to see their fortunes improve enough, were the 
bill passed, to invest in making that happen. There simply is not 
enough political juice currently in the issue to get this particular ball 
rolling toward enactment at the present time-a Very Good Thing 
in Professor Pendo's eyes. 
So there you have it with regard to these essays and Tipping 
Point analysis. Although Malcolm Gladwell believes it does not 
have to take much to get an epidemic for social change moving, it 
does take a very special set of circumstances to produce a health 
care tipping point. I hope this exercise has shown that those cir­
cumstances are not so easy to come by where health care transfor­
mations are concerned-a reality that we probably all know 
instinctively. But we do have many thoughtful and creative schol­
ars, such as those whose articles appear in this Symposium, working 
to help us understand, illuminate, and resolve our continuing health 
care problems. 
